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I. INTRODUCTION 
The worst judicial opinion ever written issued from Florida on an 
anonymous day in 1864.  The opinion discussed slavery. More accurately, 
it cherished slavery—lionizing the then extant practice in the way the 
British sing of the sea. It was a judicium horribli not unlike the most 
famous U.S. legal opinion of the same era, Dred Scott v. Sandford.1 Like 
Dred Scott it was a deeply flawed opinion, yet it was far more compact of 
prose and rationale. In this way, as a legal precedent, it was a more 
dangerous opinion than Dred Scott because it was presented not as a timid 
jurist’s tortured squirmings through a broken political landscape. It was 
presented as something basic, something fundamental and inexorable, 
something not to be questioned. It was dangerously simple when conveyed 
to accepting minds in the way a cold knife is dangerous in angered hands. 
The opinion is therefore a vital study for researchers looking for the lines 
of human fallacy that in the American past have demarcated those regions 
of thought where the pretense of law dissolves real legal foundational 
principles like freedom or justice. And yet, somehow, the opinion has not 
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1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691, 1856 WL 8721 
(1856). 
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been studied; it is at present nearly forgotten. The opinion is Miller v. 
Gaskins, 11 Fla. 73 (1864). Before discussing the case, I will first sift the 
literal soil from which it sprang.  
II. THE SHORT SAD STORY OF MIDDLE FLORIDA 
Spain conquered the New World, and for more than two centuries 
after Ponce de Leon, Florida was a possession of Spain.2 The Spanish 
territory’s first experience of U.S. influence began in 1799 and reached a 
high point during General Andrew Jackson’s 1818 military expedition 
against the Seminoles and Red Sticks.3 During the Spanish era, the 
territory called Florida was a naval waystation; a geographic identity that 
persisted once it became a U.S. possession.  
There was a port and city in the panhandle at Pensacola, a naval 
depot at Key West, a port and city on the Atlantic at Jacksonville, an 
administrative settlement just south at St. Augustine, and, excepting 
groups of Native Americans and a smattering of African Americans 
branded as runaways,4 little else in terms of populace within the vast fifty-
 
2 With the limited exception of brief periods of British rule and French 
adventurism. 
3 Paul E. Hoffman, FLORIDA’S FRONTIERS 274-279 (Indiana Univ. Press 
2002); Walter W. Manley II ed., et. al., THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 
AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS, 1821-1917 3 (1997 Univ. Press of Fla.). 
4 The Native American Seminole tribes of northern Florida were never 
conquered by the Spanish, and during the Spanish Era in Florida, they 
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thousand square mile triangle of space between the Atlantic, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and Georgia.5 In its interior, this Florida was a frontier, 
influenced by the temperate climes, the Spanish, the sea, and a pioneering, 
individualistic ‘Cracker’culture subsisting on tiny smallholding farms and 
cattle pens.6
were joined in their forests and marshes by groups of African Americans 
escaping from slavery in Georgia, then known as Maroons. Sean Michael 
O’Brien, IN BITTERNESS AND IN TEARS: ANDREW JACKSON’S
DESTRUCTION OF THE CREEKS AND SEMINOLES 32, 188  (The Lyons Press 
2003). 
5 Manley, supra note 3 at 3-4, 187; Spanish territorial Florida was larger 
than the present-day U.S. state, stretching so far to the west so as to 
include the cities of Baton Rouge, Natchez, and Mobile. Michael Gannon, 
ed., THE NEW HISTORY OF FLORIDA 150, 164 (Univ. Press of Fla. 1996); 
Nicholas De Fer, (Map) Les costes aux environs de la Riviere de Misisipi 
[1705], LEWIS ANSBACHER MAP COLLECTION No. 134, 4th Floor, Map 
Room, Main Branch, Jacksonville Public Library, Jacksonville, Florida 
(accessed September 7, 2006).  
6 Larry Eugene Rivers, SLAVERY IN FLORIDA: TERRITORIAL DAYS TO 
EMANCIPATION 253 (2000 Univ. Press of Fla.). On territorial Florida’s 
distinctive ‘Cracker’ culture, see note 12, infra.
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With the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, ratified in 1821, Florida was 
ceded to the United States.7 And while U.S. territorial Florida was 
adjacent to and contiguous with states that we now call ‘the South’ or ‘the 
Old South,’ Florida at the time of its annexation from Spain was not at all 
Southern. 
This changed once the economic, social, and cultural institution 
that was plantation agriculture was imported into that swath of inland 
space known then as ‘Middle Florida,’ the land in today’s northern Florida 
between the Suwanee and Apalachicola rivers.8 Cotton was the world’s 
most important and arbitraged commodity in the early nineteenth century,9
and Middle Florida ran on it.  
 
7 Michael Gannon, FLORIDA: A SHORT HISTORY 27-28 (2003 Univ. Press 
of Fla.). 
8 Rivers, supra note 6 at 47 (showing map); David R. Colburn and Jane L. 
Landers, eds., THE AFRICAN AMERICAN HERITAGE OF FLORIDA 105 (1995 
Univ. Press of Fla.). 
9 See Steven Yafa, BIG COTTON: HOW A HUMBLE FIBER CREATED 
FORTUNES, WRECKED CIVILIZATIONS, AND PUT AMERICA ON THE MAP 86-
90 (Viking Penguin 2005)(By 1825, the young United States exported 171 
million pounds of raw cotton to Great Britain annually; cotton’s nickname 
in the nineteenth century U.S. South was “white gold”; financing the U.S. 
cotton production created the London financial giants Barclays and 
Lloyds). 
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The scions and heads of wealthy planting families seated in North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee emigrated to Middle Florida in numbers 
during the 1820s, 30s and 40s—there they chased rich soils and a lack of 
established land ownership.10 These ‘legacy planters’ snatched up tracts of 
land for growing cotton, first through squatting, and later through hard-
sought political favors from the territorial government in Tallahassee.11 
These planters were Southern, they were different in means, class and 
outlook from their smallholding cracker12 neighbors, and they quickly 
organized and consolidated control over most of the Florida Territory’s 
 
10 Rivers, supra note 6 at 10; Colburn et. al., supra note 8 at 129 (noting a 
contemporaneous newspaper account of the soils in Middle Florida as the 
finest agricultural district in the United States). 
11 Baptist, infra note 14 at 91.  
12 During the territorial period, a Florida Cracker was a (usually white) 
settler or pioneer who typically subsisted on growing corn in small areas, 
hunting, fishing, and herding cattle and hogs. Dana St. Claire, CRACKER:
THE CRACKER CULTURE IN FLORIDA HISTORY 10 (Museum of Arts and 
Sciences 1998). Some Crackers eschewed livestock raising and instead 
subsisted on fishing or shellfish harvesting in Florida’s rivers and beaches. 
Id. at 68. By the time of the Civil War, ‘cracker’ referred generally to any 
white person living in Florida who was not a slaveowner. Id. at 51. 
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local and territorial politics.13 And they grew much wealthier, producing 
great yields of cotton and setting up their own banks to attract further 
credit and investment from European commodity speculators.14 Within a 
decade, some counties in Middle Florida were among the wealthiest in the 
entire South.15 It was a boom economy; it ran on slave labor.  
Money and farming techniques were not all the planters brought 
with them from the Old South. There was a widespread belief among 
Southern plantation owners and their families that they existed as a kind of 
American nobility or gentry16—as real as the English feudal nobility and 
gentry that survived into the times when many of the planters and their 
parents were born.  
A planter of Virginian origin might refer to himself as a 
‘cavalier,’17 a direct reference to a knight-type of fighting person serving 
 
13 Rivers, supra note 6 at 14; Gannon, supra note 7 at 40; Colburn et. al., 
supra note 8 at 130. 
14 Edward E. Baptist, CREATING AN OLD SOUTH: MIDDLE FLORIDA’S
PLANTATION FRONTIER BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 111 (Univ. of North 
Carolina Press 2002); Hoffman, supra note 3 at 298-300. 
15 Rivers, supra note 6 at 252. 
16 Baptist, supra note 14 at 7.  
17 Baptist, supra note 14 at 2; Yaffa, supra note 9 at 162 (describing the 
romanticized preferred southern planter identity as being descended from 
royalist exiles escaping from Cromwell’s England);  see generally 
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the English Crown during the seventeenth-century reign of Charles II. 
Planters all over the Old South were keen on the medieval-era novels of 
Sir Walter Scott, e.g., Ivanhoe, and imagined themselves as the real 
successors to Scott’s fictional characters.18 Hyper-romanticism and myth-
making19 were everywhere; wealthy people were styling themselves not 
just as wealthy but as a real aristocracy.20 It was a collective exercise in 
taking on airs, but it had a savage dark side—an ideology of white 
supremacy.21 
William R. Taylor, CAVALIER AND YANKEE: THE OLD SOUTH AND 
AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER (Doubleday New York 1963).  
18 Baptist, supra note 14 at 250. 
19 Yaffa describes a set of carefully constructed core values the southern 
planter imputed to himself, and followed, as a sort of secular religion, as 
including honor, chivalry, bravery, and the importance of lineage. See 
Yaffa, supra note 9 at 159.  
20 Baptist, supra note 14 at 261.  
21 See, e.g., Yaffa,  supra note 9 at 150 (“Southern whites genuinely 
believed blacks could not fend for themselves [ . . .]”). But this was an 
atypically nuanced white supremacy insofar as it existed outside of any 
real feudal or monarchical political system and was premised upon equal 
parts racial consciousness and class consciousness. According to historical 
reviews of generally held social beliefs of the age, the planters also 
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The Middle Florida planters transformed much of Florida into a 
Southern state quickly. By the 1861 outbreak of the Civil War, Florida 
was home to 61,000 enslaved African Americans.22 Florida was the third 
state to secede from the Union.23 Florida sent eighty percent of its eligible 
adult men into the Confederacy’s army, and shipped tons of assistance to 
the grey troops in the manner of food and supplies.24 Florida supplied the 
Confederacy with three significant generals and a secretary of the navy, 
and Florida’s secession-era Governor, Joseph Milton, committed suicide 
rather than see the state captured by U.S. forces.25 The Civil War nearly 
began at Pensacola’s Santa Rosa Island during a standoff between U.S. 
naval and infantry forces stationed at Fort Pickens and 5,000 massed 
 
believed themselves to be superior to their white Cracker neighbors. See 
Baptist, supra note 14 at 90, 103; Hoffman, supra note 3 at 303.    
22 Manley et. al., supra note 3 at 187. 
23 Manley et. al., supra note 3 at 189; Gannon, supra note 7 at 41. 
24 Id. at 193; The army-filling was accomplished in part through a new 
conscription law, which, it should be said, was resisted by a substantial 
number of Florida men with pro-U.S. leanings, often at the risk of their 
lives. See Gannon et. al., supra note 5 at 234-236. 
25 Gannon, supra note 7 at 46. 
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confederate troops commanded by General Braxton Bragg.26 After the 
Civil War was finished, Florida’s Legislature, still controlled by the 
planters and their allies, passed one of the harshest anti-black codes27 in 
the country; banning African Americans from moving into the state, and 
prescribing punishments like whipping, pillories, and forced labor for new, 
black-only offenses.28 
III. MILLER V. GASKINS 
The setting for Miller v. Gaskins was this same antebellum Middle 
Florida; specifically, Wakulla County. Wakulla County is that especially 
picturesque inverted triangle of space lying south from Tallahassee, laying 
between the St. Marks and Ochlocknee Rivers, terminating in the Gulf of 
Mexico at places named Shell Point and Alligator Point.  
The case tells the story of Thomas G. Gaskins, a planter who died 
in the summer of 1862.29 At the time of Thomas’ death, a woman named 
 
26 Gannon et al., supra note 5 at 233 (noting that the fighting ending the 
standoff at Pensacola’s Fort Pickens finally broke out two days after the 
famous firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina). 
27 Id. at 48 (“these so called Black Codes represented an attempt by the 
former slaveholders to reinstitute the slave system in fact if not in law.”).  
28 See Donald G. Nieman, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 86-98 (1979).   
29 Miller v. Gaskins, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 *1 (Fla. 1864). 
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Sarah resided at the Gaskins’ household as a slave.30 Thomas also had a 
trusted friend at the time of his passing, Charles K. Miller.31 Out of guilt 
perhaps, or sympathy, or a form of humanity, Thomas had made out a will 
before dying “bequeathing” Sarah to the stalwart Charles Miller, but “in 
trust,” so that Sarah would be allowed “to go, if she wishes, to any free 
[s]tate.”32 Thomas’ will went further and authorized an expenditure of up 
to a hundred dollars from what would become his estate after death to 
arrange for Sarah’s needs and transport.33 
As to Sarah, the case recites that it was complained of by Thomas’ 
family heirs that Charles Miller largely did his friend’s bidding and 
arranged for her to leave her situation at the Gaskins farm, directing her to 
go where she would without restraint, without subjecting herself to the 
authority of Miller or anyone else.34 
30 See id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at * 1-2. Sarah’s options for destinations out of Middle Florida might 
likely have included black and Indian settlements in southern and central 
Florida, and also the Bahamas, and settlements in Cuba and Mexico, in 
addition to the free states of in the northern U.S. See Colburn et. al. supra 
note 8 at 120; Gannon et. al., supra note 5 at 181. 
33 Miller, 11 Fla. 71, 1864 WL 1117 at * 2. 
34 Id. 
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The case arose when Thomas’ grandchildren, assisted by a 
guardian, sued to void the ‘Sarah clause’ in Thomas’ will, and to force her 
sale back into slavery through auction, with the proceeds going to the 
estate, and thence to them.35 The grandchildren won this relief before a 
state trial court, and after losing, Charles Miller petitioned the Supreme 
Court of Florida, seeking a reversal and a ruling that he acted legally under 
the authority of a valid will.36 
Eight years before this dispute reached the Florida high court, the 
Supreme Court of the United States decided Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856). Dred Scott was the notorious 
case in which an African American man, Dred Scott, filed a lawsuit in a 
Missouri federal district court, seeking freedom for himself, his wife 
Harriet, and their two children.37 Scott won in the district court, but then 
was re-enslaved by the pens of the majority-voting U.S. Supreme Court 
justices, lead by Roger Taney, on the grounds that the district court below 
 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
37 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397-399, 19 How. 393, 15 L.Ed. 
691 (1856); see also Don E. Fehrenbacher, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 239-49 (Oxford U. Press 
1978).  
Winter for Purehearts 
By Michael Cavendish*  
could not have properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Scott’s 
plaintiffcy.38 
Because of its extreme notoriety, and since it was decided well 
before Miller v. Gaskins, Dred Scott was likely known to the Supreme 
Court of Florida Justices deciding Miller, and probably seemed to be a 
natural analogue to the controversy before them in some respects. 
Not unlike Justice Taney’s extreme narrowness of focus on subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida framed Miller solely as a 
will contest that would be decided by divining whether the Sarah clause in 
Thomas’ will was effective or void. Following the customs of the law of 
estates, the first thing the Miller v. Gaskins court did was look to the 
testator’s intent in framing the Sarah clause in the will.39 Thomas had, in 
the five clauses preceding it, bequeathed the other men and women 
residing at his farm in slavery to his heirs; he gave a grandson a woman 
named Nelly, and to his granddaughter he gave a woman named Rose.40 
And in each of those preceding bequests, Thomas had referred to the 
bequeathed people as slaves, viz. “my slave Nelly.”41 But in the Sarah 
 
38 See id. 
39 Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *2-3. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
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clause, he had only referred to Sarah by her name, without the crippling 
title of ‘slave.’42 
The Miller v. Gaskins court turned the Sarah clause in Thomas’ 
will over and over like a prism, looking at every angle, importing probable 
intent into his every word. And afterwards, the Court decided that Thomas 
did mean to place Sarah under Charles Miller’s ‘trusteeship,’ but not his 
ownership or control. 43 
What Thomas wanted for Sarah had been done before. As early as 
a half-decade before Miller issued, the Virginia Supreme Court had 
approved a will releasing several African Americans formerly held as 
slaves into freedom.44 George Washington famously provided in his own 
will that the persons held as slaves at his home were to be freed upon his 
death.45 
All that was left of the work the Miller court gave to itself at this 
point was to decide whether the Sarah clause was valid. At this point, the 
Florida Justices very probably looked to Dred Scott again. But perhaps it 
was not Justice Taney’s majority opinion from which they would draw 
their inspiration. 
 
42 See id. at *1. 
43 Id. at *3.  
44 Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call.) 270 (1799).  
45 Paul Finkelman, “Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall”: 
The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325, 329 (1994). 
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Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion repeatedly apologized46 for the 
decision he was writing. He forlornly offered that while certainly African 
Americans were part of the same human family that the Declaration of 
Independence declared “created equal,” there was also, to his mind, 
incontrovertible proof that the Framers of the Constitution intended to 
exclude blacks as citizens and full-fledged people.47 
Not so with the concurring opinions in Dred Scott. The concurring 
opinions were bullying. The Dred Scott concurring justices added their 
sundry thoughts atop Taney’s moping formalism in turns, scourging the 
notion that Scott could be considered ‘a man’ as of the time they were 
writing.48 They beat away at Scott’s humanity as if it were a garish piñata. 
 
46 See for example Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405 (“it is not the province of the 
court to decide the  . . . injustice  . . . or impolicy of these laws [ . . .]”), 
407 (“It is difficult . . . to realize the state of public opinion in relation to 
that unfortunate race . . . when the Constitution of the United States was 
framed and adopted . . .[b]ut the public history . . . displays it in a manner 
too plain to be mistaken.”), 426 (“No one, we presume, supposes that any 
change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race . . . 
should induce the court to give . . . the Constitution a more liberal 
construction [ . . .]”). 
47 See id. at 407, 411-412.
48 These ranged from the perfunctory, id. at 469 (“the plaintiff is a slave, 
and therefore not entitled to sue in a court of the United States”)(Grier, J., 
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To justify the propriety of the institution of slavery, they invoked the 
historical example of England, and then the Romans.49 They went far 
beyond Taney’s pale, eager to outdo one another in adding just one more 
reason to keep Scott shackled. The dark enthusiasm of the concurring 
justices seeps through the text of their opinions even today.  
 
concurring) and at 529 (“Scott . . . is a slave, and was so when this suit 
was brought.”)(Catron, J., concurring), to the punctilious, id. at 470 (“the 
plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri . . . but was a negro of 
African descent [ . . .] )(Daniel, J., concurring)(emphasis in the original), 
to the pseudo-Mosaic, id. at 475 (“Now the following are truths which a 
knowledge of the history of the world . . . compels . . .the African negro 
race have never been acknowledged as belonging to the family of nations [ 
. . .]”)(Daniel, J., concurring), to the quasi-genocidal id. at 475-76 (“[a 
slave] is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the 
interests, the convenience, or the will, of his owner [ . . .]”)(Daniel, J. 
concurring)(emphasis in the original). Douglas R. Egerton has made the 
insightful comment that as to someone held in slavery against their will, 
magistracy of this type is nothing more than the doings of a well dressed 
mob. D.R. Egerton, HE SHALL GO OUT FREE: THE LIVES OF DENMARK 
VEASEY 181  (1999 Madison House Pub.). 
49 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 477-80, (Daniel, J., concurring), and at 490 
(Campbell, J., concurring). The majority opinion also blamed the origin of 
the institution of American slavery upon England. See id. at 407-08. 
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Perhaps writing with the Dred Scott concurrences in mind, to cap 
the analysis of the Sarah clause, the Miller v. Gaskins court penned what is 
incontrovertibly the most shameful sentence in the whole history of 
Florida law:  
There is no evil against which the policy of our laws is 
more pointedly directed than that of allowing slaves to 
have any other status than that of pure slavery.50 
The trial court would be affirmed. Sarah would be sold into slavery all 
over again. Following this sentence, those were foregone conclusions.  
IV. ANTICANON 
Miller v. Gaskins is what some constitutional law theorists are 
labeling an ‘anticanon.’51 If a case like Brown v. Board of Education and 
its ‘separate is not equal’ message is considered a ‘canon’52of 
 
50 Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *4. 
51 See for example Sharon E. Rush, The Anticanonical Lesson of 
Huckleberry Finn, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577-78 (Summer 
2002); Richard Primus, Canon, Anticannon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243 (1998); 
52 In certain recitations of constitutional theory every anticanon needs a 
canon, a case shining that light of agreed right-ness, to complement it. It 
may be that the complementary cannon to Miller v. Gaskins is actually an 
English case decided some eighty years before Florida plunged into the 
depths of “pure slavery”—Somerset v. Stewart, 1 Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 
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constitutional law for its normative right-ness, an opinion like Miller is 
considered the opposite, a case somehow pushed so far away from the 
generally agreed way that things ‘ought to be’ that its very normative 
wrong-ness, its absence of virtue, allows it to instruct theorists and 
students alike as a negative example; an anti-canon.53 
499, 499 (K.B. 1772); see also generally Steven M. Wise, THOUGH THE 
HEAVENS MAY FALL 179-184 (2005 Da Capo/Perseus Press).  In that 
opinion, a Jamaican black man who lived in slavery, James Somerset, 
traveled to England and sued there for his freedom, much like Dred Scott 
would many years later. Id. In deciding Somerset, the Chief Justice of the 
King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, ruled in favor of Mr. Somerset’s freedom.  
Id. In what would have created the bitterest irony for Dred Scott had it 
been brought to his attention, what enabled Lord Mansfield to find slavery 
illegal as a matter of substantive law was the fact that England had no 
written constitution or bill of rights that excluded blacks, while at the same 
time, blacks and whites were not treated unequally by the common law. 
See Finkelman, supra note 45 at 325-26. Had England at the time of the 
opinion had a written bill of rights, James Somerset might have met Dred 
Scott’s same fate.  
53 Professor Mark Graber has explained the canon/anticannon concept, 
albeit without the labels, thus: “[c]ontemporary constitutional theory rests 
on [these] premises. Brown v. Board of education was correct [ . . .] Dred 
Scott v. Sandford was  . . . wrong.” Mark A. Graber, Desparately Ducking 
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Dred Scott is a well known anticannon. Dred Scott has now been 
cited or discussed in excess of 4000 times in judicial opinions and 
scholarly legal literature.54 Hardly a year goes by in which two or three 
legal intellectuals in the academy or on the bench do not pick it up and 
turn it over, looking for some further lesson to impart from it.55 
Miller v. Gaskins, in contrast, has been ignored, cited in but one 
other legal opinion56--for a banal rule of substantive law relating to the 
testator’s intent under a will—and briefly mentioned in a history book57 on 
the Supreme Court of Florida.  That Miller has been so overlooked ought 
to be remedied, since it contains anticanonical lessons of equal value to 
those found in Dred Scott.
Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 271 (Summer 1997).  
54 These can be counted with the use of a citation aggregator such as 
West’s online Key Cite feature. 
55 See for example Graber, supra note 53 at 272 (“Proponents of judicial 
restraint maintain that [the opinion] demonstrates the evils that result when 
federal justices prevent the elected branches of government from resolving 
major social disputes. Originalists maintain that [the opinion] 
demonstrates the evils that result when constitutional authorities fail to be 
tethered by precedent [ . . .]”).   
56 That opinion is Rewis v. Rewis, 84 So. 93 (Fla. 1920). 
57 See Manley, supra note 3 at 195.  
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Return to the sentence. Focus on the fourth word, “evil.” In the 
sentence, evil is used to label two objects; freedom, or a “status [other] 
than that of pure slavery,” and also a type of equity or leniency in the law, 
that quality that would allow Thomas’ humanitarian will to be done.58 The 
sentence marries two legal ideas, personal freedom in the human rights 
context and freedom of intent from the common law tradition, and by fiat 
assigns a moral/religious value to them, a value that is exactly the opposite 
of the value that the vast majority of contemporary civilized thought and 
the vast majority of legal and judicial scholarship would assign to those 
ideas. “Evil,” as used here, is dehumanizing to Sarah; a usage that paints 
her humanity as anti-moral, anti-jurisprudential, and even anti-theological. 
It is a usage that is also inappropriately uncivil.59 
Words eight through eleven, “policy of our laws,” are the Miller 
court’s attempt to shoehorn an artificial volksgeist,60 the use of the myth-
 
58 See Miller, 11 Fla. 73, 1864 WL 1117 at *4. 
59 By uncivil, I refer not to a complaint over manners but rather to a usage 
of language that both obscures the substantive legal issue at hand and robs 
the subject of that language of their dignity. See Michael Cavendish, 
Civility In Written Advocacy, THE BENCHER 10-11 (July/August 2005). 
60 Volksgeist was a German romantic idea coined by Herder, suggesting 
that each people had their own recognizable “special genius,” that lead to 
the unsurprising follow-on idea that each nation or culture of peoples 
should be left to cultivate this special quality of theirs. See this definition 
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invoking “our,” into an appeal to public policy. “Our” as used here is an 
interpolation of a notion of a homogenous folk group and their supremacy, 
a supremacy that takes precedence over anything else.   
The final two words in the sentence, “pure slavery,” connote a 
totalitarian approach to lawfinding. The Miller court wanted no 
exceptions, no shades of gray in their slave law. It was to be “pure 
slavery” for Florida, with no room for questioning or dissent. “Pure 
slavery” also suggests a kind of search for purity—purity of ideology in 
the white supremacist ideas that lurked behind Florida’s pro-slavery laws. 
Viewing the sentence as a whole against the backdrop of my 
dissective efforts, I can sketch two preliminary lessons that reveal some of 
the danger Miller presents.  
The sentence is historicist. Historicity is the practice of according 
value to something, across a spectrum of like things, in accordance with 
the perceived legitimacy or brilliancy of its historical pedigree.61 At the 
time Miller issued, many citizens in Florida, and particularly within 
 
at sparknotes.com online study guide, 
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/1848/terms/term_29.html 
(accessed August 2, 2006). 
61 For a good introduction to the potential problems created by historicist 
elements in legal thought, and an introduction to the concept of historicity, 
see Richard A. Posner, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 168-192 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2004). 
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Middle Florida, were wrapped in a false sense of history that, according to 
its adherents, extended the institution of human slavery and the 
corresponding tenet of white supremacy from times immemorial up to 
their present.62 These historical ideas were wildly inaccurate, although not 
to the Court’s perception of history. Florida had been a pro-slavery 
territory only for a matter of decades at the time, there was half a nation 
north of Florida that disagreed with the propriety of slavery, and Great 
Britain, Florida’s new ‘mother country’ after annexation, had abolished 
slavery decades earlier. The historicist ideas imbued in Miller’s awful 
sentence essentially masked within a popular legend or fake folk history 
some very blunt, brutal political and cultural preferences as to where the 
teeth of the law would bite.63 
The sentence is also imperialist. I use the term imperialism here to 
mean a group’s continuum of behavior that trends toward the aggressive 
and that is directed against other groups by both formal and informal 
means.64 The Miller v. Gaskins court did not just decide the case before it. 
 
62 For an example of this, look no further than reports of the public 
remarks of Alexander Stephens, the Vice President of the Confederacy, 
who lauded slavery and racial inequality as the “cornerstones” of the 
southern nation. Finkelman, supra note 45 at 348.  
63 See Posner, supra note 61 at 168. 
64 I borrow this definition from G. Randal Hornaday, who used the term in 
a review of the same cultural phenomenon that gave rise to Miller v. 
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The Miller court wanted slavery for “our,” for “us,” for all of Florida, and 
beyond, for the great-great-grandchildren of the justices. This was an 
exportation of an ideology with the goal of ensconcing it in perpetuity, up 
in the fancied ether.  
Miller’s brand of imperialist lawgiver is anathema to a free society 
because the imperialist’s frame of reference is that he will decide the law 
before deciding the case, putting the interest of whatever the source of the 
imperialism is, be it a regime or an idea, ahead of the rights or interests of 
the lawsuit parties. The calling card of this imperialism, as I use the 
concept, is not the substance of the idea being pushed, it is the pushing 
itself, and the attendant subjugation of rights, responsibilities, comity, 
polity, process, pluralism, intellectual rigor, or due process. It is the 
bending of all of these hallmarks of a free society to the imperialists’ 
wants or will.  
Here is why these anticanonical lessons, these faults of thought, 
require the result that the opinion is dangerous. A legacy of Miller v. 
Gaskins is that it marked a kind of ‘winter for purehearts.’ To most, that 
description paints what must have seemed to Florida blacks and white 
abolitionists of the era to be the bitterest nadir in that period of 
slaveocracy in Middle Florida—a time when it seemed that the law, the 
 
Gaskins—the pre-Civil War slave culture of the U.S. South. G. Randal 
Hornaday, The Forgotten Empire: Pre-Civil War Southern Imperialism,
36 CONN. L. REV. 225, 233 (Fall 2003).  
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just laws, had vanished and would not return. But consider that common 
experience and history teach that there were people living then, as there 
are now,65 for whom there is painted an opposite bleakness; their despair 
at the deliberate advance of the Union troops the year the opinion issued, 
freeing chained men and women from plantations one mile at a time, 
spoiling the mythical Eden imagined by the planters and their families. 
One winter ended, the other, what the overwhelming majority of 
Americans would describe as the false winter, persists. And this despairing 
fact, the very existence of antipodal views of the right-ness of the times 
surrounding the case, the fact that there are, somewhere, accepting hands 
waiting for the cold knife that is that terrible sentence, is precisely why 
Miller is a danger that ought to be studied instead of forgotten. Miller v. 
Gaskins is an anticannon if ever there was one. Like Dred Scott, it is an 
American legal opinion and a part of American legal heritage in need of 
thousands of discussions.  
 
65 See for example Amy Keller, Hate in the Sunshine State, FLORIDA TREND Vol. 49, No. 
6, 80-84 (September 2006)(cataloguing active white supremacist hate groups in Florida).  
